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Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice 
 
Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar, and Trystan S. Goetze 
 
Abstract 
This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic 
epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and 
social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation 
of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and 
often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, 
along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes an 
approach to epistemology that we refer to as non-ideal epistemology. In this introductory 
chapter we introduce and contextualise the ten essays that comprise this volume, 
situating them within four broad sub-fields: vice epistemology, epistemic injustice, inter-
personal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. We also provide a brief overview 
of several other important growth areas in non-ideal epistemology. 
 
 
This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic 
epistemology. The first has been an increasing recognition of the active and social nature 
of our epistemic lives. For most of the 20th century, the impression generated by the 
epistemological literature was of epistemic agents as generic and isolated individuals, 
more or less passively inheriting beliefs from their environments. It was these beliefs, 
and not the epistemic agents themselves, that served as the prime focus of epistemic 
analysis, with the two central questions in the field focussing on when it is that beliefs 
count as justified, and when it is they count as knowledge. This idea of our epistemic lives 
as something isolated or passive is, of course, a philosophical fiction; a useful one at times, 
perhaps, but a fiction nonetheless. Knowing, believing, and understanding, and the 
practices of inquiry, deliberation, and investigation that endow us with these states, are 
not just things that happen to us, but are very often things that we do, that require making Ǥǯǡ
we do together, in groups, as part of larger social networks and communities, and with 
our own particular identities and characters. 
 
The recognition of our epistemic lives as something active and involving 
interaction with other epistemic agents has become a central part of epistemological 
theorising in the past couple of decades, as manifested in particular by the flourishing 
fields of social and virtue epistemology. The second development we wish to draw 
attention to remains somewhat more nascent. Inspired by the work of 20th century 
feminist epistemologists and drawing upon insights from moral and political philosophy, 
a growing number of theorists have begun to place at the centre of their work the insight 
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that, insofar as our epistemic lives involve things that we do, they involve things that we Ȃ both as individuals and as communities Ȃ can do badly. So, for example, whilst some ǯǡǯ
epistemic vices. Whilst certain groups find society geared towards their epistemic 
interests, others find large bodies of ignorance encapsulating topics that are of real 
significance to them. Whilst some find themselves treated fairly in their epistemic lives, 
others find themselves on the receiving end of distinctly epistemic injustices. And whilst 
the acquisition and sharing of knowledge is often supported by networks of trust, at other 
times the makeup of society and the state of social relations can leave people unable to 
trust those whom it is most in their interests to do so. When our epistemic practices break 
down in these ways, people are often harmed or wronged in various aspects of their lives Ȃ not just epistemically, but also socially, morally, and politically. 
 
The increase in interest in these and other breakdowns in epistemic practice 
reflects a growing appreciation of the import of what we might think of as non-ideal 
epistemology.1 This kind of epistemology focusses not on what our epistemic lives look 
like when everything runs as it should Ȃ on the nature of justification, the sources of 
knowledge, or the mechanisms of testimony and trust Ȃ but on what our epistemic lives 
look like when things go wrong, as they so often do. It thus encompasses topics like the 
epistemology of ignorance; disagreement; epistemic injustice; vice epistemology; the 
critical epistemology of race, gender, indigeneity, and disability; and various areas of 
applied and social epistemology. It examines what it means for our epistemic practices 
and activities to go wrong in these ways, why they do so, the epistemic and non-epistemic 
harms that follow, and the extent to which these harms are wrongful. Crucially, it also 
explores how we might try and respond to or ameliorate these harms and wrongs.  
 
This volume assembles a collection of essays that offer a snapshot of the kinds of 
issues explored within non-ideal epistemology. We do not claim that this represents a 
cohesive field of study, still less that it forms a singular research project. The papers 
presented here cover a diverse range of topics, and do so by drawing upon a wide array 
of different theoretical resources. Nonetheless, they are united by a shared interest in the 
challenges, impediments, inequities, dangers, and failures that are part and parcel of our 
epistemic lives. The aim behind this volume, and the 2017 Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Departmental Conference at the University of Sheffield from which it originated, is that 
bringing together theorists with this shared interest in the negative could highlight the 
extent of the recent shift in this direction within epistemological theorising. In so doing, 
it could also illuminate new ways in which theorists from quite different sub-fields and 
exploring quite different issues could learn from and work with one another. 
 
                                               
1 The distinction between ideal and non-ǯA 
Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). Charles W. Mills offers a powerful defence of the 
significance of non-ǮǲǳǯǡHypatia 20 
(2005), 165-184. 
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Our main task in the remainder of this introductory chapter is to provide an 
overview of the papers presented in this volume. We do so by ordering them loosely 
according to four central themes: vice epistemology, epistemic injustice, inter-personal 
epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. We also end by briefly detailing several 
important themes that are not directly covered by this volume, but which nonetheless 
represent significant growth areas in non-ideal epistemology. Carving the volume, and 
non-ideal epistemology more generally, according to these themes helps to lend some 
order to proceedings, but it should not be taken to signify any hard and fast divisions. 
Several of the papers included touch upon two or more of these themes, and they 
frequently speak to one another in ways that transcend these categories.  
 
Vice Epistemology 
 
One of the areas in which this recent uptake of interest in the non-ideal manifests itself is 
in the field of character-ǡ  Ǯǯǡ  Ǥ  
feature of virtue epistemology is its focus on the evaluation of epistemic agents, and 
specifically the exploration of what qualities make someone an excellent or deficient 
epistemic agent.2 For much of its recent history, however, virtue epistemologists have 
focussed more or less exclusively on the epistemic virtues themselves, traits like open-
mindedness, intellectual humility, conscientiousness, and diligence.3 It is only in the past 
few years that sustained attention has been turned towards the (arguably more common) 
intellectual vices, traits like arrogance, dogmatism, negligence, and intellectual rigidity.4  
 
The study of the intellectual vices specifically, what Quassim Cassam has referred Ǯ ǯǡ
intellectually vicious, what are the nature and effects of specific vices, and how do the 
intellectual vices relate to the intellectual virtues.5 Two contributions to this volume 
                                               
2 Heather Battaly, 'Virtue Epistemology', Philosophy Compass 3 (2008), 639-663; John Turri, Mark Alfano, 
and John Greco, 'Virtue Epistemology', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/epistemology-virtue/>. 
3 Some relatively early exceptions to virtue epistemology's focus on the positive include: Casey Swank, 
'Epistemic Vice', in Guy Axtell (ed.) Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Contemporary Virtue 
Epistemology (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 195-204; Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). For discussion of why vice has been overlooked in the virtue 
epistemological literature, see Charlie Crerar, 'Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice', Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming). 
4 A further, arguably related, non-ideal approach to virtue epistemology is represented by the situationist 
challenge, which employs psychological evidence to argue that true epistemic virtues are, in fact, 
vanishingly rare. See, for example, Mark Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge, Cambridge  ǡ  ? ? ? ?ȌǢ     Ǥ ǡ Ǯ ǯǡ Philosophical Studies 168 
(2014),665-692; Abrol Fairweather and Mark Alfano (eds.), Epistemic Situationism (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
5 Quassim Cassam, 'Vice Epistemology', The Monist 99 (2016), 159-180. Other prominent works in vice 
epistemology include: Heather Battaly, 'Epistemic Virtue and Vice: Reliabilism, Responsibilsm, and 
Personalism' in Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Chinese 
and Western Philosophy: The Turn Towards Virtue (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 99-120; Ian James Kidd, 
'Charging Others with Epistemic Vice', The Monist 99 (2016) ,181-197; Alessandra Tanesini, '"Calm Down 
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    Ǥ  ǯ Ǯ -Mindedness be an ǫǯ-mindedness, 
seemingly a paradigmat     Ǯ ǯ  
epistemologists,6 might on occasion count as an intellectual virtue. Building upon an 
account of closed-Ǯ
relevant intellectual optionsǯǡ7 Battaly identifies three different conceptions of 
intellectual vice: effects-vice, responsibilist-vice, and personalist-vice. Focusing 
specifically on effects-ǡǮ
a preponderance of bad epistemic effects (or fail to produce a preponderance of good 
epistemic effects)ǡǯ8 Battaly then illustrates how, in the normal case, closed-mindedness 
does generally meet this criterion. However, she goes on to note certain cases where acts 
of closed-mindedness might count as virtuous on account of the effects they produce, 
before drawing the still more provocative conclusion that, in epistemically hostile 
environments, the disposition to be closed-minded might count as virtuous. She ends by 
noting that, despite the apparent hostility of aspects of our present epistemic 
environment, we should be wary about using this argument to justify closed-mindedness 
in the actual world. 
 ǯ Ǯǣǯǡ
the question of when a certain trait or quality counts as virtuous and when it counts as 
vicious serves as a major theme. The central notion of her discussion is esteem, which she Ǯǡǡ
for their good or bad qualitiesǯǤ9 After providing some initial discussion of esteem and the 
related notions of reputation and admiration, Tanesini goes on to argue that it is ǣǮǯ
situations where we are relying on the expertise of others, 10 and can also be helpful in ǯǤǡ
desiring esteem provides an incentive to raise performance, and that, as a consequence, 
esteem can be virtuously pursued. Not all desires for esteem are virtuous, however, and  ǯǣ 
vanity, and intellectual timidity. 
 
Epistemic Injustice 
 
                                               
Dear": Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing, and Ignorance', Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 
(2016), 71-92. 
6 Quassim Cassam, 'Vice Ontology', Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (2017), 20-27, at 20. 
7 Heather Battaly, 'Can Closed-Mindedness be an Intellectual Virtue?', Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplementary Volume 84 (2018) PAGE REFERENCE THIS VOLUME. 
8 Battaly, 'Can Closed-Mindedness be an Intellectual Virtue?', PAGE REFERENCE TO THIS VOLUME. 
9 Alessandra Tanesini, 'Caring for Esteem and Intellectual Reputation: Some Epistemic Benefits and Harms', 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 84 (2018) PAGE REFERENCE TO THIS VOLUME. 
10 ǡ ?ǯ PAGE REFERENCE TO THIS VOLUME. 
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In the last few decades, the topic of epistemic oppression has attracted significant 
philosophical attention. Drawing on previous work on various dimensions of oppressive 
power relations in feminist, anti-racist, post-colonial, Marxist, and other theoretical 
frames and activist movements, theorists have identified epistemic oppression as  Ǯǯǥǯ.11 One 
significant form of epistemic oppression discussed in several contributions to this volume 
is epistemic injustice.12 This term was coined by Miranda Fricker to describe a type of Ǯǯ.13 Fricker describes 
two types of epistemic injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs where a ǯ
is understood but the hearer unfairly downgrades her credibility because of a prejudice   ǯ  ǡ     city as a giver of 
knowledge.14 Hermeneutical injustice occurs where a widespread absence of shared ǯ
in the first place, either by the hearer or even by the speaker herself, wronging her in her 
capacity as a giver or producer of knowledge.15 Numerous other forms of epistemic 
injustice have been identified in connection with, for example, wilful ignorance of 
marginalisǯǡf epistemic goods, and 
the undermining of ǯ    .16 There has also been some 
significant work applying various concepts of epistemic injustice to concrete cases, such 
                                               
11 ǡǮǯǡSocial Epistemology 28 (2014), 115Ȃ38, at 115. 
Examples of early articulations of this kind of idea are found in Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays 
in Feminist Theory (Berkeley, CA: The Crossing Press, 1983); Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and 
Speeches, ȋ	ǡǣǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǢ
ǡǮǫǯǡ
in C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Champaign, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1988), 271Ȃ313; Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and 
the Politics of Empowerment, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1st ed. published 1991; Lorraine Code, 
Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations (London: Routledge, 1995); Charles W. Mills, The Racial 
Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); María Lugones, Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing 
Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). Types of epistemic ǡǡǡǮ ǡ    ǯǡ Hypatia 26 (2011), 236Ȃ57; José Medina, The 
Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations  ȋǣǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǢǡǮǯǡErgo 3 (2016), 569Ȃ90. 
12 For a comprehensive overview of work on epistemic injustice, see Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile 
Pohlhaus (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice (London: Routledge, 2017). 
13 Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, 1. 
14 See also Jeremy Wanderer, 'Addressing Testimonial Injustice: Being Ignored and Being Rejected', 
Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2012), 148Ȃ169; Gaile Pohlhaus, 'Discerning the Primary Epistemic Harm in 
Cases of Testimonial Injustice', Social Epistemology 28 (2014), 99Ȃ114; Emmalon Davis, 'Typecasts, Tokens, 
and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice' Hypatia 31 (2016), 485Ȃ501. 
15 See also Rebecca Mason, 'Two Kinds of Unknowing', Hypatia 26 (2011), 294Ȃ307; Charlie Crerar, 'Taboo, 
Hermeneutical Injustice, and Expressively Free Environments', Episteme 13 (2016), 195Ȃ207; Trystan S. 
Goetze, 'Hermeneutical Dissent and the Species of Hermeneutical Injustice', Hypatia 33 (2018), 73Ȃ90. 
16 
ǡǮic Injustice: Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical ǯǡ Hypatia 27 (2012), 715Ȃ ? ?Ǣ  ǡ Ǯ  ǣ   ǯǡ 	ǣ    ǯ  33 (2012), 24Ȃ ? ?Ǣ  ǡ Ǯ   ǯǡ Episteme 7 (2012), 101Ȃ113; Christopher Hookway, 'Some Varieties of Epistemic 
Injustice: Reflections on Fricker', Episteme 7 (2010), 151Ȃ63. 
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as educational justice, rape and domestic abuse myths, and healthcare practices 
concerning intersex patients.17 
 
 The usual focus in the epistemic injustice literature is on ways we can be wronged ǤǡǮ
Epistemic Trust Injustices   ǯǡ  
   ǡ
focussǯreceiver of knowledge. In 
the process, she identifies a new class of epistemic injustices: epistemic trust injustices. 
She concentrates in particular on the ways in which epistemic trust injustices arise in 
interactions between expert and lay communities, especially between scientists and 
marginalisǤ
ǡ Ǯ ally 
important case to examine with respect to epistemic injustices... it is a dominant and 
powerful form of knowing in contemporary society, with deep significance for the ǯ.18 Given the importance of scientific knowledge, 
and the division of intellectual labour that specialised knowledge production entails, 
relationships of epistemic trust are essential. In order to trust responsibly, we must 
exercise our epistemic agency by judging which speakers and which groups of putative 
experts deserve our trust. Doing so with regard to scientific communities, Grasswick 
argues, involves not just identifying their ability to provide us with significant knowledge, 
but also whether they sincerely care for our interests in producing and sharing their 
knowledge. Epistemic trust injustices arise when it is impossible to responsibly place ǯon account of their having historically failed to meet the 
conditions of trust vis-à-vis ǯ  ǡ   often the case for those in 
marginalised communities. As Grasswick shows, this harms the subjects of epistemic 
trust injustices in their capacity as receivers of knowledge, and produces a negative 
feedback loop where similar injustices recur because lay communities disengage from 
expert inquiry altogether. Grasswick closes with a few suggestions for addressing 
epistemic trust injustices by repairing expertȂlay relations and increasing the 
participation of marginalized communities in scientific inquiry. 
 
 AǯǮǡǡǯǡ
particularly work on epistemic oppression by feminists of colour, to explore the place and 
role of anger   Ǥ      Ǯ  the ǯ.19 Bailey sketches the ways in which epistemic oppression provokes 
anger, how mechanisms similar to those that silence and dismiss marginalisǯ
                                               
17 ǡǮǡǡǯǡEducational Theory 63 (2013), 
331Ȃ ? ?ǢǡǮǯǡ Journal 
of Applied Philosophy 34 (2017), 191Ȃ ? ? ?Ǣ  ǡ Ǯ	 Ǯǯ  Ǯǯǣ    ǯǡSynthese (forthcoming). 
 
18 
ǡǮǯǡRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplementary 
Volume 84 (2018) PAGE REFERENCE THIS VOLUME. 
19 ǡǮǡǡǯǡSupplementary 
Volume 84 (2018) PAGE REFERENCE THIS VOLUME. 
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testimony also work to cool and dismiss their anger, and how holding on to onǯ
in the face of injustice is an important and useful tool for resisting oppression. In the 
process, she introduces a variety of vivid concepts and distinctions, such as María ǯ      -to-handle because it is heavy Ȃ 
frustrating and exhausting in the face of repeated failures to be taken seriously Ȃ and 
anger that is hard-to-handle because it is rebellious Ȃ disorderly because directed against 
existing social and epistemic structures that make it difficult to be taken seriously in the 
first place.20 ǯǡ
in which the anger of oppressed people is managed: tone policing, which identifies 
moments of anger and silences them as irrational or improper, and tone vigilance, which ǯǤ
Bailey stitches together these distinctions Ȃ ǮǯȂ 
to give a multifaceted picture of knowing resistant anger, a kind of righteous anger        ǯ   ǯ  ǡǯǯ
taken seriously within dominant interpretive frames. 
 
Inter-Personal Epistemic Practices  
 
One of the key insights that motivated the turn towards theorising the social dimensions 
of epistemology was the significance of familiar inter-personal interactions, 
communications, and exchanges for our epistemic lives and conduct. What is striking 
about the early analytic work in this area, however, is the extent to which discussion of 
our socio-epistemic practices initially focussed (and, to some extent, still focusses) upon 
the internal mental states of the agents involved in such interactions, and how little it 
explores the ways in which those interactions actually play out within public and social 
spaces. The literature on disagreement, for instance, has primarily concerned the 
question of how, and if, epistemic agents should revise their beliefs and other doxastic 
states in the face of disagreement.21 Similarly, much of the work on testimony has 
                                               
20 See Lugones, Pilgrimages/Pereginajes. 
21 For a snapshot of the debate on disagreement, see Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.), 
Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The 
Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). For work on 
disagreement with and between groupsǡǤǡǮ
ǯǡRatio 27 (2014), 
11-28; Bryan Frances, Disagreement (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014); Mattias Skipper and Asbjørn Steglich-ǡ Ǯ
 ǣ    ǯǡ Synthese (forthcoming); David ǡ Ǯ   ǯǡ    ȋǤȌǡ Essays in Collective 
Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 143-163. For work on deep disagreement, where 
disagreements in belief can be explained by underlying differences in the norms, principles, and  ?ǡǡǮǯǡ Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2014), 7- ? ?Ǣ  Ǥ ǡ Ǯ  ǯǡǡȋǤȌǡSocial Epistemology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 262- ? ? ?Ǣ
ǡ Ǯm and Reasonable ǯǡ	ƬȋǤȌǡDisagreement 187-215. Four examples of recent work taking 
the debate in new directions are ǡǮ
in Scientific Practice: The Case 	ǯǡStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 
(2013), 169- ? ? ?Ǣ	ǡǮǯǡn Patrick Reider (ed.) Social Epistemology and 
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focussed upon theorising the conditions and mechanisms by which knowledge or 
warranted belief can be acquired via the testimony of others.22 Yet, if we are to fully 
appreciate the ways in which our social-epistemic practices not only benefit but also 
disadvantage (and even harm) those involved, then we need to pay attention to the fact 
that these practices do not occur in the cold calm of the ǯǤ
Rather, they occur Ǯout in the openǯ: in public, social, sometimes vexed, and often 
complicated interactions and exchanges between people.  
 
The three contributions to this section of the volume can all be seen as 
contributing to a reorientation of social epistemology to more avowedly grapple with the 
interpersonal aspects of epistemic practice in the ways just outlined. Casey Rebecca 
JohnsonǡǮǲǨǳǣǯǡ new 
focus to the debate on disagreement. Departing from the conventional approach to 
discussing disagreement, Johnson asks    ǯ   
discovering disagreement should be, but what she should do in the public and social space 
in which she realises that disagreement. Is it permissible, in the face of disagreement, to 
stay quiet and keep her opinions to herself? Or, is she obliged to make her opinions a 
matter of public record? Johnson argues the case for the latter. Not only are we obliged to 
make it known that we disagree with others, but often we are epistemically obliged to do 
so. Drawing on David ǯ    Ǯ ǯ, Johnson 
argues that when in a situation of disagreement, one must express content that at least Ǯǯat one took to be objectionable; and, crucially, one 
must make that sentiment of disagreement clear to at least some of the other participants Ǥǡǡǯ
dissent public in this way is defeasible and can be overridden by prudential and moral 
considerations, as well as epistemic ones. In the final section of the paper, Johnson 
considers four potential sources for this obligation: epistemic well-being; the nature of 
inquiry; commitments to joint action; and the nature of doxastic justification.23 
                                               
Epistemic Agency: Decentralizing the Epistemic Agent (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 75-90; ǡǮǣǯǡȋǤȌǡ
The Ethics of Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 315- ? ? ?Ǣ 	 ǡ Ǯ 
Circumstances of Democraǯǡ	ȋǤȌǡ The Epistemic Life of Groups 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 133-149. 
22 For a summary of the debate on testimony, see Jennifer Lackey, 'Testimonial Knowledge' in, Sven 
Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 
2011), 316-334. Recently, a number of robustly inter-personal accounts of testimony have been forwarded, 
including Richard Moran, The Exchange of Words: Speech, Testimony, and Intersubjectivity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018); Paul Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Sanford Goldberg, Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). See 
also more general discussion of the inter-personal nature of trust, including:  ǡ Ǯ ǯǡ Ethics 96 (1986), 231-260;  	ǡ Ǯ    ǯǡ Synthese 191 
(2014), 1975-1989Ǣ  ǡ Ǯ  ǡ   ǯ, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 72 (1994), 63- ? ?ǢǡǮǯǡSynthese 191 (2014), 
2029-2045; ǡǮǯǡEthics 107 (1996), 4-25. 
23 For other recent work on the public problem of disagreement, see Jennifer Lackey, 'The Duty to Object', 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming); Casey Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics 
and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, (New York: Routledge, 2018) 
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 Olivia Bailey turns our attention towards another fundamental epistemic practice Ȃ testimony Ȃ ǮǯǤǯ
upon testimonial exchanges that involve speakers who belong to one or more oppressed 
groups. By drawing out the complex relationship between empathy and trust in these 
cases, Bailey reveals the importance of theorising testimony in terms of the personal and 
social dynamics between recipient and speaker, not only its narrow epistemic function of 
transferring knowledge and warranted belief. Empathy, in the sense that interests Bailey,   Ǯ  -charged imaginative perspective-ǯ.24 It is a way to ǡǮǯ, as the idiom Ǥ Ǯ ǯǡ    ǡ     ǯat their word, without 
independently verifying that what they say is true. In the first half of the paper, Bailey 
explores the ways in which empathy can support testimonial trust by providing evidence 
as to the ǯǡ particularly in cases that involve what Bailey 
calǮǯ. This support ǯ
role in testimony. In the second half of the chapter, however, Bailey carefully draws out 
the darker side to the relationship between empathy and testimonial trust. In cases where 
a speaker belongs to one or more oppressed groups, Bailey explains, an unwavering or 
incautious reliance on empathy can lead to a double failure on the part of the recipient of 
testimony: firstly, to recognise the limitations of their epistemic perspective and 
imaginative capacities; and secondly, to respect the personal and moral significance of ǯnt in the testimonial exchange. With this in mind, Bailey lays out 
the case that Ȃ for all of the benefits of empathy Ȃ it can sometimes be morally and 
epistemically responsible Ǯǯ.25  
 
In a departure from the previous two chapters' focus on the core socio-epistemic 
practices of testimony and disagreement, Miranda Fricker's 'Ambivalence About 
Forgiveness' explores the epistemic functions, and possible degradations, of two inter-
personal moral practices: blame and forgiveness. Fricker explains that blame and other 
mechanisms of moral accountability have a social constructive power that functions 
proleptically. By treating a wrongdoer as if she already shares ǯ ǡ in 
other words, ǯǯǤǡǡ
into moral-epistemic domination, where the blamer shuts down the possibility of 
dialogue over the nature of the wrong committed, brow-beating the blamee into ǯǤǡȂ particularly the form Fricker calls Ǯifted forgivenessǯ, where the wronged party lets go of her feelings of resentment 
without any redemptive change on the part of the wrongdoer Ȃ can also bring about a ǯ
                                               
24 Olivia Bailey, 'On Empathy and Testimonial Trust' Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 84 
(2018) PAGE REFERENCE THIS VOLUME. 
25 Olivia Bailey, 'On Empathy and Testimonial Trust' PAGE REFERENCE THIS VOLUME. 
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ǯǤAgain, this proleptic mechanism has the potential for abuse. A gift ǯ
nature of the harm, pre-empting moral dialogue and twisting the forgiven person into    ǯ Ǥ    moral-epistemic domination is 
heightened when the forgiver and forgiven are on either side of an imbalance of social ǡǯǯ
understanding. Forgiveness can also mask or smuggle in feelings of blame, short-
circuiting the normal processes by which such resentment is communicated and 
forsworn. 
 
Applied Epistemology 
 
Once one scratches beneath the surface, one often finds that the distinction between 
applied and non-ȋǡǡǮǯȌ
to be a fairly spurious one. That is certainly the case for this volume, in which each of the 
papers included explores some recognisable way in which our epistemic lives, as 
individuals and as communities, malfunction or go wrong. Our choosing to demarcate a 
number of the papers specifically as applied epistemology should therefore be taken with 
more than a pinch of salt. Nonetheless, we do so because each of these papers contributes 
to a particular recent trend within epistemology: the bringing of epistemological insights 
to bear on important and detailed case studies. This has seen epistemologists turn their 
attention towards an increasingly diverse array of issues, including the use of the 
internet,26 the nature of fake news,27 and the epistemic standards of Anglo-American legal 
systems.28 The three papers of this section each undertake a similarly insightful applied 
analysis.29 
 
The section opǯ Ǯǯǡ
counter-terrorism theory and practice. Specifically, he considers two popular answers to  ǡ Ǯ        ǫǯ:30 the Rational Agent 
Model (RAM), according to which terrorists are rational agents who turn to violence as a 
means for pursuing their political ends; and the Radicalisation Model (RAD), according to 
which people turn to political violence because they have been radicalised. Both views, 
                                               
26 Hanna Gunn and Michael P. Lynch, 'Google Epistemology', in David Coady (ed.) The Routledge Handbook 
of Applied Epistemology (New York: Routledge, Forthcoming); Richard Heersmink, 'A Virtue Epistemology 
of the Internet', Social Epistemology 32 (2018), 1-12. 
27 Regina Rini, 'Fake News and Partisan Epistemology', Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (2017) 43-64; 
Axel Gelfert 'Fake News: A Definition', Informal Logic 38 (2018), 84-117. 
28 

ǡǮǯǡJournal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2017), 221-241. 
29 For more contributions to applied epistemology, see: David Coady, What To Believe Now: Applying 
Epistemology to Contemporary Issues (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell 2012); David Coady and Miranda 
Fricker (eds.), Special Issue on Applied Epistemology, Social Epistemology 34 (2017); David Coady and 
James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology (New York: Routledge Forthcoming). 
30 Quassim Cassam, The Epistemology of Terrorism and Radicalisation', Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplementary Volume 83 (2018) PAGE REFERENCE TO THIS VOLUME. 
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Cassam argues, are flawed. RAM, although of some value, is unable to explain cases where 
terrorism is inefficacious and it is patently irrational to believe that it could have been 
otherwise. RAD, more seriously, faces significant theoretical difficulties about what it ǮǯǡǮ
idiosyncratic ǯ
thing as the radicalisation process.31 ǯ
view he calls Moderate Epistemic Particularism (MEP), a view that seeks not to explain 
the turn to political violence in a way that will allow us to uncover general causal laws, 
but to understand    Ǥ    Ǯǯǡ  ǡ
because it does not deny the possibility of drawing interesting generalisations about the 
turn to political violence. The point, instead, is that we should recognise the limitations 
of these generalisations in the face of human particularity. 
      ǯ Ǯ ǡ  ǡ ǯ            
healthcare, revealing a number of ways in which ill persons are wronged in their capacity 
as knowers. Drawing on works by phenomenologists of illness and biographical accounts 
of the experience of illness, Kidd and Carel present a number of these pathocentric 
epistemic injustices, which are ultimately connected to the very conception of health at 
work in most healthcare settings. They show how ill persons experience testimonial 
injustice, because of prejudices arising from Ǯpathophobiaǯ, or negative attitudes towards 
illness or ill persons. Pathocentric testimonial injustice not only wrongs ill persons as 
givers of knowledge, but can also       ǯ 
regarding their treatment in the healthcare system is not taken seriously by healthcare 
providers. The issue is compounded by pathocentric hermeneutical injustices, which 
arise because there is a lack of adequate shared vocabulary for discussing the experience 
of illness, and a common distaste, even among healthcare professionals, for discussing 
suffering and death. These injustices are persistent because ill persons are often excluded 
from participation in the processes by which healthcare professionals develop shared 
understandings of illness. One root of the problem, Kidd and Carel explain, is that our very 
concept of health is excessively naturalistic, focused on functional biological aspects at 
the expense of the lived experience of illness and health. They argue that naturalistic 
conceptions of health may promote or even necessitate the pathocentric epistemic 
injustices they describe. 
 
In the final paper of the volume, Keith Harris contributes to ongoing discussion 
about the epistemic merits of belief in conspiracy theories,32    Ǯ 
                                               
31 Cassam, 'The Epistemology of Terrorism and Radicalisation', PAGE REFERENCE TO THIS VOLUME. 
32 See, for instance, David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate, (London: Routledge, 
2007); Dentith, Matthew, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); 	ǡ ǡ Ǯ  ǯǡ International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 
(2011),15-24; M. R. X. Dentith and B Ǥ Ǯ     ǣ ǯȋǤȌǡǤ 
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ǫǯsses his discussion on the 
subset of conspiracy theories that offer explanations of events that run counter to official 
accounts, as well as implicating the supposed architects of the events in question in the 
promotion of the official accounts. Outlandish as some theories of this sort might be, 
Harris is careful to point out, they sometimes turn out to be true. Likewise, it will be 
reasonable for at least some people to believe some theories of this sort. If there is a 
problem with belief in conspiracy theories so defined, then it seems reasonable to 
suppose that it lies with the practices and forms of reasoning by which those beliefs often 
came to be held, not in the content of the beliefs themselves. Harris considers three 
explanations of what the problem   Ǯ ǯ  ǣ  
typically manifests epistemic vice; that it leads to belief in unfalsifiable theories; and that       Ǯ  ǯ  Ǥ  
explanations, Harris argues, are unsatisfying, since each fails to pick out any failing that Ǯǯ
that leads to belief in supposedly more acceptable theories. In the second half of the 
paper, Harris offers his own suggestions for where the errors in conspiracy theorising 
might lie. These are two. Firstly, conspiracy theorists may employ a fallacious 
probabilistic form of modus tollens that leads to placing undue weight upon data that is Ǯǯ.33 Secondly, conspiracy theorists may display Ǯ-ǯǯies for 
error.34 
 
Other Themes in Non-Ideal Epistemology 
 
Owing to its origins in a two-day conference, this volume regrettably could not touch on 
every issue within the ambit of non-ideal epistemology. However, given our ambition to 
highlight the breadth and range of excellent work in this area, several other major themes 
bear mentioning. Whilst several of these topics represent currently flourishing areas of 
research within non-ideal epistemology, others represent areas for growth as research in 
this field continues to develop. 
 
In addition to investigations of epistemic injustice in interactions between ǡ
ǯǡ
there is growing interest in socially relevant philosophy of science more generally. Much 
like epistemology, over the 20th Century philosophy of science broadly concentrated on 
theoretical issues divorced from the social contexts in which scientific inquiry proceeds 
and in which scientific knowledge is used. Contemporary philosophers of science, 
however, are increasingly concerned not only with giving accounts of the nature of 
scientific knowledge or its background metaphysics, but also with how scientific inquiry 
                                               
33  ǡ Ǯ      ǫǯǡ Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplementary Volume 84 (2018) PAGE REFERENCE THIS VOLUME. 
34 ǡǮǫǯ, PAGE REFERENCE TO THIS VOLUME. 
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should be organized in order to serve the interests of local communities and whole 
societies, as well as the moral, political, and epistemic problems that can arise when 
science fails in these roles.35 As Carla Fehr and Kathryn Plaisance argue, doing more work 
of this kind stands to benefit society, scientific practice, and philosophical inquiry itself, 
but requires a re-orientation of philosophy of science as a field towards non-ideal theory 
and socially engaged research.36 
 
 Another topic neglected by mainstream epistemology until recently is the topic of 
ignorance. One important set of questions concern the nature of ignorance; for example, 
is ignorance the contrary of knowledge, of true belief, or something different?37 Merely 
leaving discussion of ignorance there, however, obscures many complexities. Whilst 
culpability ǯ
the epistemic condition on moral responsibility,38 there is seldom any engagement with 
relevant epistemological questions, such as the availability of evidence to the agent and ǯ.39 Moreover, under 
certain conditions, ignorant beliefs can flourish with all the same respect that ought to be 
carried by knowledge. Such ignorance is not merely a passive lack of knowledge but an 
active and persistent impediment to true belief. This is particularly concerning where 
social injustice and ignorance walk in stride, enabling and reinforcing one another. 
Charles Mills coined the term epistemology of ignorance to describe such structures as 
they arise in societies implicitly or explicitly structured on racism.40 Much remains to be 
done on the topic of ignorance, its various forms, and how this decidedly non-ideal topic 
connects with moral and political issues.41 
 
In the present political situation of increased polarization of opinion, cynicism 
about the potential for rational dialogue between opposing viewpoints, politicisation of 
expertise, and propagandistic disinformation masquerading as reliable news, practices of 
                                               
35 See, for example, Phillip Kitcher, Science, Truth, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); 
Janet A. Kourany, 'A Philosophy of Science for the TwentyǦFirst Century'. Philosophy of Science 70 (2003), 
1-14; Kathryn Plaisance and Carla Fehr (eds.), Special Issue: Making Philosophy of Science More Socially 
Relevant, Synthese 177 (2010); Nancy Arden McHugh, The Limits of Knowledge: Generating Pragmatist 
Feminist Cases for Situated Knowing (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2015). 
36 	ǡ Ǯǣǯǡ Synthese 
177 (2010), 301-316. 
37 For a recent collection discussing this and related questions, see Rik Peels and Martijn Blaauw (eds.), The 
Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
38 ǡǡǤǡ Ǯǯǡ The Philosophical Review 92 (1983), 543Ȃ71; 
 ǡ Ǯ  ǯǡ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2003), 61Ȃ84; 
George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
39     ǡ Ǯ    ǫ   ǯ, Philosophical 
Quarterly 64 (2014), 478Ȃ96. 
40 Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). See also Nancy Tuana 
and Shannon Sullivan (eds.), Special Issue: Feminist Epistemologies of Ignorance, Hypatia 21 (2006); 
Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
2007). 
41 See also Cynthia Townley, A Defence of Ignorance: Its Value for Knowers and Roles in Feminist and Social 
Epistemologies (Lanham, ND: Lexington, 2011). 
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epistemic accountability take on renewed importance. However, work in this area seems 
largely concerned with classical epistemological questions about epistemic obligations 
and justification, and questions inherited from moral philosophy about whether belief, 
like action, must be voluntary for us to be blameworthy for getting things wrong.42 While 
the notion of epistemic blame and epistemic culpability as notions distinct from their 
moral counterparts are assumed in some of the literature on epistemic injustice and 
intellectual vices, accounts of the conditions for being blamed in a specifically epistemic 
way are uncommon.43 Given the role of moral accountability in bringing us to shared 
moral understandings, we might expect its epistemic analogue to be similarly useful in 
overcoming differences of opinion in the political arena. At the very least, we may hope 
that in holding the epistemically irresponsible to account, we may prevent or mitigate the 
spread of false and misleading information. A non-ideal approach to these 
epistemological issues is sorely needed to address associated social and political 
problems.  
 
Some of the issues discussed above, such as hermeneutical injustice and the 
pernicious effects of a naturalistic conception of health, point to a way our epistemic 
practices can go wrong in a cognitively deeper way than issues arising at the level of 
knowledge production, testimony, or intellectual character traits. Namely, sometimes 
things go wrong at the level of the very concepts we use to construct our beliefs and other ǤǡǮ
though   ǥ    ǥ    ǯ.44 ǣ   Ǯ
hypotheses we can entertain, what desires we can form, what plans we can make on the 
basis of such mental states, and accordingly constrains what we can hope to accomplish ǯ.45 When our concepts go wrong, our epistemic practices and everything that 
follows therefrom can be radically misdirected. There is growing attention in analytic 
philosophy to questions regarding the critique and revision of our concepts, referred to 
variously as conceptual engineering,46 conceptual ethics,47 and ameliorative inquiry.48  
Such work has always been a part of philosophy, but conceptual analysis was for most of 
                                               
42 See, for example, Margery Bedford Naylor, 'Epistemic Justification', American Philosophical Quarterly 25 
(1988), 49Ȃ58; William Alston, 'The Deontological Conception of Justification', Philosophical Perspectives 2 
(1988), 257Ȃ99; Richard Feldman, 'Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation', in Matthias Steup (ed.), 
Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 77Ȃ92. 
43     ǡ Ǯ    ǯ Synthese 195 (2018), 2205Ȃ26. An              ǡ Ǯǯǡǯ18 (2018), 1Ȃ16. 
44 ǡ Ǯ ǯǡPhilosophy Compass 8 (2013), 1091Ȃ1101, at 
1096. 
45 ǡǮǯǡ ? ? ? ?-7. 
46 Herman Cappelen, Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018). 
47 ǡǮ ǯǤ 
48 Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
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the 20th century conceived along similar abstract lines to ideal theory in epistemology. 
More recent work takes seriously the epistemic, social, and political effects of both the 
concepts we have inherited and our efforts to improve them, as can be seen in work on 
our concepts of gender,49 sexual orientation,50 and the law.51 There is room for 
considerably more work in this area, regarding both the development of theories of 
conceptual change and conceptual error, and detailed studies of further cases of concepts 
that have gone wrong.  
 
Finally, a recurring issue in the background of most of the papers in this volume is 
the epistemological relevance of social identity, particularly where oppressive power 
relations are at work, as is nearly always the case in actual, non-ideal conditions. This 
theme reflects ongoing research in the critical epistemology of race, gender, sexuality, 
disability, indigeneity, and other axes of oppression.52 Indeed, many movements within 
non-ideal epistemology are rooted in concerns brought to light by theory and activism in 
these various and often intersecting lines of inquiry. By critically examining how social 
identities and stereotypes influence the production of knowledge and belief, in both 
academic and lay settings, non-ideal epistemology from these perspectives can reveal 
biases that contribute to epistemic and other forms of oppression. However, these critical 
approaches have historically been marginalized within analytic philosophy, and to some 
extent remain so.53 Improving the philosophical understanding of our epistemic practices 
and of the non-ideal conditions in which all of us exercise our epistemic agency requires 
serious engagement with the overlooked perspectives and experiences explored by these 
critical approaches. 
                                               
49 ǡǮ
ǣȋȌǫȋȌǫǯǡ Noûs 34 (2000), 
31Ȃ ? ?ǢǡǡǮǣ
ǯǡEthics 
126 (2016), 394Ȃ421. 
50 ǤǡǮǫǯǯ 16 (2016), 1Ȃ27; Esa Diaz-Leon, 
'Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice', Journal of Social Ontology 3 
(2017), 231-248. 
51 Natalie Stoljar, 'What Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law', in Wil 
Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
52 See, in addition to works cited in fn. 11 above, Donna Haraway, 'Situated Knowledges: The Science 
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', Feminist Studies 14 (1988), 575Ȃ99; 
Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991); Charles W. Mills, 'Alternative Epistemologies', in Blackness Visible: Essays on 
Philosophy and Race (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 21Ȃ39; Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter 
(eds.), Feminist Epistemologies (London: Routledge, 1993); Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1978); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California Press, 1990); Willie Ermine, 'Aboriginal Epistemology', in M. Battiste and J. Barman 
(eds.), First Nations Education in Canada: The Circle Unfolds, (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2000), 101Ȃ111; Anita Silvers, "Feminist Perspectives on Disability", Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/feminism-disability/>, §3. 
53  ǡ Ǯ   	       ǲǳǯǡ   
 ȋǤȌǡ Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 3-24; Kristie Dotson, 'How is This Paper Philosophy?', Comparative Philosophy 
3 (2012), 3Ȃ29; Katharine Jenkins, '"That's Not Philosophy": Feminism, Academia and the Double Bind', 
Journal of Gender Studies 23 (2014), 262Ȃ74. 
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